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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-3028 
 ___________ 
 
In re:  DONNELL PONTON, and 
PERTANIAL PONTON, 
Debtors 
 
 
Donnell Ponton,  
Appellant  
   ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 2-11-cv-04384) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 
10.6 
September 20, 2011 
 
 Before:  SLOVITER, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: September 29, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 In late November of 2009, Donnell and Pertanial Ponton filed for protection under 
2 
 
Chapter 13 (11 U.S.C. §§ 1301–30) of the United States Bankruptcy Code.1  Their 
voluntary petition noted that the sole piece of real property owned by the couple, the 
parcel located at 3714 N. 18th Street in Philadelphia, was in foreclosure proceedings.  
Vericrest Financial, Inc. (―Vericrest‖) was listed as the relevant secured creditor.   
 Eventually, the Pontons and Vericrest reached an agreement that allowed, in part, 
for a small grace period and a ―shifting‖ of arrears owed on the property to the end of the 
repayment period.  The Pontons would be responsible for paying the monthly mortgage 
payment after the expiration of the grace period.  In the event of a default on these 
payments not cured within a fifteen-day window, Vericrest reserved the right to ―certify 
the default to [the] Court,‖ after which ―an Order shall be entered granting Vericrest . . . 
relief from the automatic stay without further notice and hearing.‖  The Bankruptcy Court 
approved the arrangement on January 10, 2011.   
 Détente was to be short-lived.  In April, Vericrest (through counsel) sent the 
Pontons a notice of default; in May, it filed a Certification of Default with the Bankruptcy 
Court, alleging a failure by the Pontons to pay any of the monies owed under the 
agreement and requesting a termination of the automatic stay.  Donnell Ponton objected 
to the Certification of Default, filing a confusing document that accused Vericrest of, 
inter alia, ―Perjury in the Judicial Context‖ and sundry violations of the 14th 
Amendment.  Shortly thereafter, the trustee moved to dismiss the case due to a ―fail[ure] 
                                                 
1
 See generally Bankr. E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 09-19141.  
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to commence or continue making timely payments to the trustee as required by 11 U.S.C. 
[§] 1326.‖2  The Bankruptcy Court held a hearing on May 26 to discuss the objections to 
the Certificate of Default, after which it lifted the automatic stay by order entered on May 
31, 2011, allowing Vericrest ―to proceed with foreclosure on the property located at 3714 
North 18th Street, Philadelphia PA.‖  Donnell Ponton filed a timely appeal to the District 
Court.   
Activity in the Bankruptcy Court continued.  After a June 23 hearing, the 
Bankruptcy Court dismissed the case altogether.  Notably, Ponton did not appeal that 
decision. 
Proceedings in the District Court, meanwhile, commenced and swiftly resolved: 
on July 22, the Court dismissed the appeal from the automatic-stay order for failure to 
comply with Fed. R. Bankr. Proc. 8006.  Several days later, the Court ruled on Ponton’s 
in forma pauperis motion and again dismissed the appeal for failure to comply with Rule 
8006.  Ponton appealed the first decision and amended his notice of appeal after the 
second.   
Before us, Ponton moves to stay the Sherriff’s sale of his home, which is 
scheduled for October 4, 2011.  Elsewhere, he accuses Vericrest and its attorney of 
perjury, claims that the Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion by allowing such 
misconduct and perjury, and appears to charge all prior courts with failing to give him the 
                                                 
2
 See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(4) (authorizing dismissal or conversion when payments under 
section 1326 have not been timely made).  
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liberal construction of pleadings and submissions afforded to pro se litigants.
3
  Ponton 
also filed a motion requesting that we ―facilitate prosecution‖ of various parties, pursuant 
to a federal criminal statute.  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d)(1) and 1291.
4
  JELD-WEN, Inc. 
v. Van Brunt (In re Grossman’s Inc.), 607 F.3d 114, 119 (3d Cir. 2010); Solfanelli v. 
CoreStates Bank N.A., 203 F.3d 197, 200 (3d Cir. 2000).  As an initial matter, we must 
address Vericrest’s contention that the action is now moot.  Under its reasoning, as the 
Bankruptcy Court has since dismissed the actual bankruptcy—an order from which 
Ponton failed to appeal—no proceedings are ―left‖ for the purpose of a vacation, reversal, 
or remand.   
We agree that the appeal is moot.  ―[W]hen a notice of appeal has been filed in a 
bankruptcy case, the bankruptcy court retains jurisdiction to address elements of the 
bankruptcy proceeding that are not the subject of that appeal.‖  Transtexas Gas Corp. v. 
TransTexas Gas (In re Trantexas Gas Corp.), 303 F.3d 571, 580 n.2 (5th Cir. 2002).  And 
although Vericrest cites no case law in its filing in support of its position, decisions on 
point do exist; other courts have concluded that the dismissal of an underlying 
bankruptcy can render moot or otherwise obviate an earlier appeal.  See, e.g., Olive St. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
3
 See Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Mgmt., 641 F.3d 28, 32 (3d Cir. 2011).  
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 We have held that an order lifting an automatic stay is appealable.  See In re Connors, 
497 F.3d 314, 318 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Pelullo, 178 F.3d 196, 200 (3d Cir. 
1999). 
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Invs. v. Howard Sav. Bank, 972 F.2d 214, 216 (8th Cir. 1992) (―Once the bankruptcy 
proceeding is dismissed, neither the goal of a successful reorganization nor the debtor’s 
right to the automatic stay continues to exist.  Accordingly, it no longer serves any 
purpose to determine whether the bankruptcy court properly lifted the automatic stay; the 
appeal has become moot.‖); In re Income Property Builders, Inc., 699 F.2d 963, 964 (9th 
Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (―Once the bankruptcy was dismissed, a bankruptcy court no 
longer had power to order the stay or to award damages allegedly attributable to its 
vacation.  A remand by us to the bankruptcy court would therefore be useless.‖).  
―[W]hether a case or controversy remains after the dismissal of a bankruptcy case 
depends on whether the issue being litigated directly involves the reorganization of the 
debtor’s estate.‖  In re Universal Farming Indus., 873 F.2d 1332, 1333 (9th Cir. 1989).  
Here, as in Olive Street Investments, it would serve no purpose for us ―to determine 
whether the [B]ankruptcy [C]ourt properly lifted the automatic stay‖ now that there is no 
bankruptcy proceeding whatsoever in which to ground a stay.  972 F.2d at 216.  Simply 
put, even if the Bankruptcy Court’s lifting of the stay was somehow erroneous, we could 
not redress it now that an order of dismissal, which Ponton did not challenge, has been 
entered. 
For the reasons given, we will dismiss Ponton’s appeal as moot.  His remaining 
motions are denied. 
